Doświadczenia międzynarodowe w zakresie systemu elektronicznej identyfikacji by Jakubowski, Szczepan et al.







Abstract – The authors have discussed the models of electronic 
identification systems used in the European countries and the 
USA. In many countries, the state has defined only the basic 
standards of functioning for the engaged institutions as part of 
safety and interoperability guarantee.  The trust services market in 
Europe has been defined, while putting an emphasis on its diver-
sity. The most common trust service offered by entrepreneurs or 
private and public institutions is the issuance of  qualified certifi-
cates.  On the other hand, the trust services providers very rarely 
undertake to create qualified electronically registered services, 
probably due to the complexity of the enterprise. Also the issues 
of electronic  identification security undertaken by the EU states.  
 
Key words - models of electronic identification systems, EU, 
USA. 
 
Streszczenie – Autorzy mówili modele systemów identyfikacji 
elektronicznej  stosowane w krajach europejskich i USA. W wielu 
krajach państwo w ramach zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa i in-
teroperacyjności określiło jedynie podstawowe standardy funkc-
jonowania dla zaangażowanych instytucji. Scharakteryzowano 
rynek usług zaufania w Europie, podkreślając jego duże 
zróżnicowanie. Najczęstszą usługą zaufania oferowaną przed 
przedsiębiorców, instytucji prywatnych i publicznych jest wyda-
wanie kwalifikowanych certyfikatów.  Natomiast najrzadziej, 
prawdopodobnie ze względu na poziom skomplikowania przed-
sięwzięcia dostawcy usług zaufania podejmują się stworzenia 
kwalifikowanych usług, rejestrowanych elektronicznych 
doręczeń. Omówiono także kwestie bezpieczeństwa w el-
ektronicznej identyfikacji podejmowane w państwa EU. 
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he electronic identification system emerging in Poland 
(also in the healthcare sector), together with the includ-
ed authentication process, is based upon a federative 
model  [1]. There are three basic models of electronic iden-
tification systems. The first one is a centralised scheme 
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citizens’ digital identity. It is acceptable to cooperate with 
private entities which may offer electronic identification 
and authentication services. However, in order to confirm 
the data, these entities shall need an access to a central state 
database the private institutions depend on.  This system 
operates in Italy, Belgium, India or Pakistan. The second 
model, far more popular in Europe, is called federative and 
assumes cooperation between public and private institu-
tions.  The infrastructure of this scheme is defined e.g. by 
the legislator but it allows for the cooperation of a number 
of systems and tools of public and private identification. 
One of the first countries which successfully introduced this 
model is  Estonia which makes a good example of a well- 
functioning system for the remaining countries. This system 
operates also in Finland, Norway and Great Britain. The 
third one is an open market model which allows for free 
cooperation of private and public entities in terms of acces-
sibility of identification services and the used tools. This 
scheme works in the United States, where the government 
has defined only the basic standards of functioning for the 
engaged institutions as part of the process of ensuring secu-
rity  and interoperability [1].  
Estonia is a country which has a big experience in the 
field of electronic identification and digital services. Nearly 
100 percent of Estonian citizens have an access to electron-
ic identification means through which they can realise most 
of public administration services in a digital manner. An ID 
card with electronic layer, identity confirmation performed 
by banking or IT systems are only a few examples of wide-
ly available electronic identification means [1]. 
According to Accenture report from 2017, about 300 
thousand qualified certificates have been issued in Poland 
so far and they are used with qualified electronic signa-
tures. Additionally, six entities have been operating within 
the trust services domain in Poland, offering 27 services in 
total.  These institutions include: Unizeto Technologies 
S.A., Polska Wytwórnia Papierów Wartościowych [Polish 
Security Printing Works], Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa 
S.A. [National Clearing House], ENI GMA Systemy 
Ochrony Informacji [Information Security Systems], Euro-
cert and Asseco Data Systems [2]. 
 
 
II. TRUST SERVICES MARKET IN EUROPE 
 
 
The trust services market in Europe is quite diversified. 
In 2017 the market involved 29 engaged countries with 150 
qualified trust services providers and about 1000 qualified 
trust services. The biggest number of companies offering 
trust services comes from Germany (72 providers) and Italy 
(70 providers) (Figure 8). Additionally, we can observe a 
tendency for some entities to provide their trust services 
locally within their countries, while others tend to work 
internationally [2]. 
The most common trust service offered by entrepreneurs 
and private or public institutions was the issuance of quali-
fied certificates which constituted 75% of all services.   
The least common, on the other hand, probably due to the 
complexity of the enterprise, are the qualified services of 
registered electronic deliveries and as such they constitute 
only 1% of all  trust services.  [2]. 
In terms of security, we must remember about three 
things. First of all, every electronic system containing med-
ical data should be protected by means of encryption con-
trolled by the owner and enabling safe storage, transmis-
sion and access. Secondly, the process of setting up and 
maintaining the patient’s documentation should preserve 
not only the contents authenticity, but also data integrity 
and configurable patient’s privacy in the whole process of 
documentation integrity with other entities (including open 
and closed healthcare). Last but not least, it is important 
that providing access to medical documentation and sharing 
it ensures a comprehensive verification of resources 
through signatures and certification process against blind 
demands and unauthorised data alterations crucial for  pa-
tients’ health and users’ contracts [3].  
26 European countries use solutions based upon elec-
tronic identification of their citizens. The Ministry of Digit-
ization and the Ministry of the Interior and Administration 
in Poland are currently making the second attempt to de-
sign such tool in the form of electronic ID. The first at-
tempt made as part of the pl.ID project financed by EU 
fund was not completed in due time and the whole enter-
prise was abandoned. The second attempt assumes that the 
first electronic IDs shall be introduced by the end of March 
2019. The proposed tool will be in the form of ID card with 
an electronic layer and will be used for the authentication 
purposes in digital services of public administration and 
healthcare, including signing electronic documents [4].  
It is important that the designed electronic document  
provides a high-level authentication in case of an access to 
the patient’s sensitive medical data, its approval or signing. 
Additionally, apart from electronic ID, another project co-
ordinated by the Ministry of Health  is planned and it in-
volves the introduction of Medical Specialist Card [Karta 
Specjalisty Medycznego- KSM]. This useful tool will make 
easier for health professionals to create and send authorised 






electronic documents like e-sick leaves, e-prescriptions or 
e-referrals in a safe manner  [4,5].  
The primary concept of electronic ID has changed. Due 
to the eIDAS regulation, which added another type of sig-
nature (advanced electronic signature) and advised techno-
logical neutrality, a wider scale of action could be intro-
duced. Thanks to it, an easier connection with Electronic 
Lines will be planned. Additionally, solutions based upon 
cloud computing such as a server signature or „on the fly” 
signature are being considered. [4].  
The method of server signature involves storing the keys 
(encrypted data) necessary to identify the user on the side 
of the service provider, whereas the authentication process 
uses other mechanisms including tokens, one-time pass-
words, mobile devices and others [2]. This is a business-
based solution with an entrepreneur offering his digital 
services to a public institution as part of a concluded 
agreement. The following types of sharing can be specified:   
software sharing (software-as-a-service), technical infra-
structure sharing ( infrastructure-as-a-service) or a combi-
nation of the two abovementioned types- full-functionality 
platform (platform-as-a-service). This method functions in 
Austria where the authentication process is performed by 
means of one-use SMS password [6].  
Another technique of electronic signature, which could 
be considered for future use  is the so-called “on the fly” 
signature. In this method the user’s identity is confirmed by 
means  of an electronic ID or special data used for append-
ing signatures, certification or digital data destruction  
[2,7].) The „on the fly” signature service can be operated 
with mobile applications or web platforms using the Inter-
net link and webpage mechanisms. The advantage of this 
method is the lack of obligation to store the key used for 
appending the user’s signature as it has a temporary form. 
This method lowers the cost of the service operation due to 
the fact that appending the electronic signature is charged 
only once, you don’t bear the costs of certificate validity 
extension for the following two years. The „on the fly ser-
vice” provider makes the environment for appending signa-
tures available to the user while informing him/her at the 
same time about the legal effects of electronic signatures 
and the contents of electronic document. The approval be-
ing made, the signatory starts the digital signature mecha-
nism which generates temporary certificate on the basis of 
identifying data [2]. This method guarantees security in 
accordance with the eIDAS regulation. 
Entities conducting healthcare activity may use one of 
the two solutions (optionally a modification thereof) while 
processing the patients’ data. The first solution involves 
data processing and safeguarding on the organisation’s 
premises while performing legally imposed activities. The 
second solution is to transfer by contract the responsibility 
for IT systems and data security to a professional third-
party. One of the positive aspects is the fact that  a coalition 
of Cloud Infrastructure Services Providers in Europe 
(CISPE) has been established which specifies the standards 
of data processing, warehousing and securing in the form of 
a cloud computing infrastructure [8]. Additionally, the 
General Data Protection Regulation -GDPR- introduces the 
notion of the administrator’s and processor’s liability. In 
the health service sector it means that both the administra-
tor (a healthcare centre) and the data processor (the service 
provider) outsourcing the data are held equally liable for 
the data safeguarding and processing [89]. Current identifi-
cation and authentication methods used in healthcare cen-
tres aren’t usually based on the cloud computing technolo-
gy. The healthcare centres only use the users’ names and 
passwords as a means of safeguarding sensitive data stored 
in internal electronic systems based upon local servers. It 
presents itself as a weak link in the structure of the patients’ 
data security. Identity management performed in the cloud 
helps preserve security, identification and control and fo-
cuses particularly on the identity and access control [10].  
A cloud signature used in the cloud computing is an elec-
tronic signature appended on a virtual device shared by the 
trust service provider. Cryptographic keys necessary for the 
authentication process are affixed to a certified device and 
only the user (owner of the keys) is granted an access to 
them in the process of strong identification. The signature 
affixed in this way does not require additional devices as 
the process takes place through a platform guaranteed by 
the service provider. The functionality of such signature is 
comparable to the ones used with cartographic cards and 
certificates [2]. 
There are a few types of electronic signatures which 
could be used for signing electronic documents. The source 
literature has defined so far 8 types of electronic signatures 
singled out on the basis of technologies used in them. 
These shall include: a keyboard signature, an e-mail signa-
ture, a handwritten signature, a manual signature, a bio-
metric signature, a password signature, a mobile or crypto-
graphic signature. A keyboard and e-mail signature, similar 
in nature, consist of signing a person’s forename and sur-
name on an electronic document with the use of a key-
board. Additionally, a scan of a handwritten signature is 
recognised as an e-mail signature. A manual signature in-
cludes data concerning the schemes of hand movements 
performed during a signature affixed with the use of a digi-






tal pen. The scheme of this action is also used by a hand-
written biometric signature. Using a password (from a to-
ken or a scratch card) together with a sign-in ID constitute 
a password signature. Mobile devices (a smartphone or a 
tablet) are used for the purpose of a mobile signature, 
whereas a cryptographic signature requires encrypted data 
stored on real media or on remote cloud computing [11]. 
When it comes to the authentication issue, it worth notic-
ing that there is a variety of authentication methods, includ-
ing the ones based upon biometric mechanisms.  The most 
commonly used is the biometrics of a handwritten signature 
(biometric signature) described above, however there are 
some other methods which include: fingerprints, face or 
voice biometrics. The fingerprint biometrics is used within 
the framework of solutions involving the collection of fin-
gerprints on electronic cards, the so-called match-on-cards 
and the use of smartphone functionalities. In case of face 
biometrics, special three-dimensional cameras are used, 
potentially also smartphone cameras. Voice biometrics, on 
the other hand, collects unique audio recordings of the us-
er’s voice. Biometric methods used in the authentication 
process constitute only part of the process and do not pro-
vide full security. Therefore, additional safeguards based 
upon the user’s knowledge or possession are required. A 
barrier for using this method is  caused by the  weak ele-
ment of  biometric sensor responsible for collecting bio-
metric features and their verification since this process in-
volves  the risk of incorrect data processing or data ma-
nipulation [2]. 
The last proposed solution is the technology of block-
chain which, according to experts, constitutes a safe man-
ner of data sharing with the use of automatic cryptographic 
data coherence check. Data is stored in a digital account 
book including a connected transaction block. Blockchain 
is usually a decentralised system based upon a not very 
popular communication system where the entities have the 
same ‘peer-to-peer’ competing rights. In the last few years 
we could see an increasing interest in  the blockchain tech-
nology as a new model of data sharing  used e.g. in the 
banking or medical sector. An example of using this tech-
nology in healthcare sector is the Medical Chain platform. 
This platform stores data related to the patients’ health and 
makes it available to doctors, hospitals, laboratories or 
pharmacists, whereas the health insurers  can request for an 
access to medical documentation and use it for their own 
purposes [12]. 
The banking sector, on the other hand,  is working on the 
implementation of the blockchain technology together with 
the qualified electronic stamp. An example of such tech-
nology could be the prototype of  a web platform with a 
connection to selected banks on the principle of distributed 
data registers prototype. This technology is planned to be 
widely used in banks due to its good efficiency tests results 
and high security potential  [13].  
According to Petrenko et.al., the blockchain technology 
is a realistic solution to one of the major requirements of IT 
systems used in healthcare, i.e. data security. The purpose 
of blockchain technologies is to assure that the patient’s 
data shall be encrypted by a trusted cryptographic algo-
rithm and shall be stored and shared on distributed servers 
providing security and reducing the accessibility problems. 
The most important feature of this solution is the constancy 
of the data registered on a blockchain. Moreover, this solu-
tion provides the patients with  an access to their own  in-
formation with a simultaneous utmost respect for the pro-
tection of privacy, while at the same time allowing all the 
interested parties to use anonymous data for research and 
medical purposes  [14]. However,  there are limitations 
caused by the lack of proper regulations which could 
acknowledge the data signed in the form of a blockchain as 
legally binding. There are some grounds implying that in 
the future this technology could replace the currently used 
solutions of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), i.e. the 
procedures and computer systems used for the purposes of 
entity authentication and identification or data security 
based on private and public key cryptography together with 
electronic certificates used e.g. in trust services. Addition-
ally, the combination of blockchain functionality with trust-
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